Quelques bonnes raisons de voter Macron

A J-7, quatre candidats sont dans un mouchoir de poche. Marine Le Pen et Emmanuel Macron sont encore favoris, mais la dynamique est clairement en faveur de François Fillon et Jean-Luc Mélenchon.

L’hypothèse d’un second tour avec Marine le Pen est solide compte tenu du très haut niveau de certitude de ses électeurs (85% de ceux qui disent vouloir voter pour elles en sont certains, selon le dernier sondage Ipsos publié dans le Monde le 14 avril). Le socle d’Emmanuel Macron, qui est au même niveau dans les intentions de vote, est moins solide (68%). Continue reading “Quelques bonnes raisons de voter Macron”

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More To Macron Than Ideological Ambiguity

Article first published on Social Europe

When asked where he stands on the left-right axis, Emmanuel Macron gives a long answer along these lines: “I come from the left, but I don’t believe the left-right divide is the right one today. Look at how both the left and the right are divided, and how primaries have reinforced radicals from each side. Look at the number of issues on which there is a left-right consensus. I believe in another axis, which matters more today: the opposition between progressives and conservatives.”

This ambiguous positioning has earned Macron a lot of mockery. As the old joke on the French left goes, when someone claims to be neither left nor right, then he/she is right-wing. Opponents from either side of the political spectrum accuse him of being a classic liberal centrist, sharing common features with ex-president Valéry Giscard D’Estaing. The recent alliance formed with historic centrist figure François Bayrou only validates their assumption. Continue reading “More To Macron Than Ideological Ambiguity”

Comment on CETA (radio)

monocleIn October, Belgium held back the EU from signing CETA, the tentative Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada. A deal was eventually reached among Belgian regional authorities on 27 October, and the CETA was signed on 30 October. I discussed this episode twice on Monocle 24 radio.

Royaume-Uni: vers une hégémonie conservatrice?

mayNote publiée pour la Fondation Jean-Jaurès le 13 octobre 2016 suite aux conférences annuelles des partis politiques britanniques.

“Trois mois après le référendum qui a vu la victoire du Brexit et quinze jours après la réélection de Jeremy Corbyn à la tête du Labour, quelle est la situation politique au Royaume-Uni ? Renaud Thillaye analyse la mise en place du gouvernement conservateur de Theresa May, ses premières mesures et les défis qui attendent les progressistes.”

La note est accessible ici: https://jean-jaures.org/nos-productions/royaume-uni-vers-une-hegemonie-conservatrice-0

The French ‘maximalist’ view on Social Europe

Article first published by Clingendael in June 2016. 

Since the early days of European integration, French policy-makers and commentators have held maximalist views on Social Europe. In 1989, François Mitterrand famously said: “Europe will be social, or will not be”. The dominant picture is one of fear of foreign competition and accusations of heartless neighbours. The French like to think they are the only ones to defend the human face of European integration. Crucially, there is little recognition of and reflection on the German and Norther European lack of trust in their Southern partners. France’s approach to Social Europe can be categorised in three groups of claims and demands.
Upward harmonisation of social conditions
The first set dates back to the negotiations of the Rome Treaty, during which the French government secured a social policy chapter. They did so under the pressure of French employers’ federations who feared labour cost competition from other member states. The idea that market integration brings about unfair competition and ultimately leads to a social race to the bottom, or ‘social dumping’, is very present in the French view on Europe and globalisation despite only patchy evidence. The development of EU social standards in employment and working conditions was seen by Jacques Delors as instrumental to winning French support for further market integration. The 2005 referendum on the EU’s Constitutional treaty was lost partly on the perception that the EU was a market that left ordinary people unprotected.

Continue reading “The French ‘maximalist’ view on Social Europe”

Le Brexit ouvre un débat utile pour l’Europe

Article publié par le Monde le 20 juin 2016.

La possibilité d’un Brexit se dessinant chaque jour un peu plus, on peut déjà tirer des enseignements du référendum britannique du 23 juin. Quel qu’en soit le résultat, le succès de la campagne en faveur du « Leave » doit conduire les pro-Européens à s’interroger sur ce rejet et ne pas reproduire les erreurs du passé. La réaction au Brexit ou à une victoire étriquée du « Remain » ne saurait passer par davantage d’intégration, mais par une remise en question sur le mode de fonctionnement de l’Europe.

Première leçon, le camp du Brexit surfe avec brio sur la vague de contestation d’élites qui ne sont plus considérées comme représentatives. En promettant de restaurer la démocratie et la souveraineté dans leur pureté, les anti-européens s’attribuent le monopole de l’idéal démocratique. Ce faisant, ils gagnent non seulement en respectabilité, mais touchent du doigt un immense défi : celui de réconcilier ouverture et intégration européenne avec démocratie. La réponse traditionnelle, qui a consisté à renforcer le caractère démocratique des institutions européennes, n’a pas eu l’efficacité escomptée. Les raisons n’en ont pas été suffisamment analysées. Force est de constater que toutes les institutions, qu’elles soient nationales ou européennes, politiques ou économiques, sont aujourd’hui suspectées de ne chercher que le renforcement de leur propre pouvoir.

Deuxième leçon, le camp du Brexit propose un changement concret dans la vie des Britanniques : une diminution de l’immigration intra-européenne en mettant fin à la liberté de circulation des personnes. Le caractère potentiellement toxique de ce message – initialement porté exclusivement par le leader du UKIP Nigel Farage, mais depuis relayé par des personnalités plus modérées – a été largement atténué par la proposition de mettre en place un système d’immigration à points, comme en Australie et au Canada. Le slogan « reprendre le contrôle » (« Take back control ») y trouve une traduction bien réelle, là où les chiffres avancés par les pro-Européens sur les bénéfices économiques supposés de l’intégration européenne se heurtent à un mur de scepticisme.

Continue reading “Le Brexit ouvre un débat utile pour l’Europe”

Europe 2.0? The EU after the British referendum

Article first published by Policy Network on 24 May 2016.

At a Policy Network seminar on 12 May, plausible post-referendum scenarios were discussed. Brexit or not, one thing is certain: there will be no EU superstate in the future

For Brexiters, history is already written: the EU is on course to become a superstate. Britain had better jump off the train before it happens, and other enlightened nations would be well advised follow suit. Those who have studied European integration in recent years know that this claim is not just gross exaggeration – it is completely misleading. Rigorous understanding of what the EU is today and what ‘integration’ has meant in the recent past is crucial to dispel this myth. It also helps to make an informed judgement on how the UK referendum is likely to impact on the EU, whatever the result.

No federal Europe: the new intergovernmentalism

Most Remainers and Brexiters share one particular assumption: that the crisis in the euro area will force integration in a core group of EU member states and redesign the European project. Little has changed in the British perception since Osborne’s famous suggestion that the eurozone should embrace the “remorseless logic” of monetary integration in 2011. The assumption is largely correct, but there is confusion as to the timeframe and what is meant by ‘integration’. Six years after the beginning of the debt crises, it has become clear that there is a significant share of ‘reluctant Europeans’ not only in the UK, but spread across the euro area. The currency union has not taken giant steps towards a fiscal union and more central institutions. The short-term firefighting on display relies on member states’ one-off contributions, conditional collective loans, intrusive peer surveillance and fiscal policy through the monetary backdoor. More radical decisions, such as debt mutualisation, the setting-up of automatic transfers or simply debt reliefs, have been methodically avoided so far. Creditor countries have resisted pressures to depart from the Maastricht surveillance-based architecture.

Such reluctance to supranational and solidarity mechanisms is best understood in the light of the shift from the ‘permissive consensus’ of the early years of European integration to the ‘constraining dissensus’ characterising EU policymaking today. While the first decades were driven by business interests far away from a relatively indifferent public, the expansion of the EU’s reach to core state powers (such as money and border management) has led to politicisation, mostly in negative terms. The public’s reluctance to fully transfer resources and state powers to the EU has brought about the paradox of intergovernmental integration. The ‘new intergovernmentalism’ theory has formulated a number of hypotheses on this new integration course, such as the informal rule of deliberative decision-making (by opposition to the formal possibility of majority voting) and the multiplication of ‘de novo’ agencies with member states representatives – such as the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and Frontex – to the detriment of the genuinely supranational European commission.

Continue reading “Europe 2.0? The EU after the British referendum”

Beyond Brexit: can the EU operate as a platform?

Article first published by Policy Network on 03 May 2016.

Can the concept of ‘platform’ offer a new way of thinking about how the EU can effectively operate?

Whatever the outcome on 23 June, the British referendum has already left a deep mark on the European Union (EU). The Brexit debate is taking place against the background of numerous serious crises directly questioning the EU’s relevance, with all leading to different conclusions. While British leaders have been criticising the EU for its regulatory and institutional overreach – “something that is done to people rather than acting on their behalf”, as David Cameron put it atBloomberg in January 2013 – most voices on the continent have deplored the EU’s lack of clout and ability to impact on ‘big things’ such as immigration, socioeconomic divergences and security. This very paradox is likely to cast a long shadow on the EU’s future: some nations like it as soft as possible, while others see no other way than a political union.

Yet does it make sense to hold the EU together in the presence of such diverging projects, and can it work? In this piece I argue that the concept of ‘platform’ offers some interesting insights on how the EU could operate in the future, in a digitised world where the thirst for bottom-up initiative goes alongside the need for collaboration, data-sharing and resource-pooling.


A world celebrating autonomy and innovation

Let us start where the leave campaign want to take us in the UK. Despite their unconvincing economic argument, advocates of Brexit have done a good job of asking essential questions about democracy and global success in the twenty first century. Michael Gove has put “democratic self-government” at the top of the Brexit rationale, a perfectly reasonable principle. The leavers often take ‘small’, agile democratic nations such as Switzerland, Israel, Canada, Australia and New Zealand as evidence of the possibility to flourish outside larger ensembles. They doubt the EU’s legal and institutional architecture is necessary for European nations to manage their interdependence. Why wouldn’t intergovernmental co-operation and free trade be enough?

Europeans have long answered this question. Back in the 1950s, creating a common market and embedding co-operation within supra-national institutions was seen as a condition for success and instrumental to installing peace. European nations voluntarily locked themselves in the same house and could not escape from the task of building it. After getting in, Britain did a lot to prevent the European house from aiming too high, or building the walls too thick. Instead, it promoted the idea of a large, open tent.

Continue reading “Beyond Brexit: can the EU operate as a platform?”

French labour market reform: good intentions, poor delivery

Article originally published by Social Europe on 04 April 2016.

If French politicians are serious about unemployment, they should work on an ambitious, long-term plan rather than a technocratic package

France has not been short of controversial discussions in the past few months, in a context dominated by the terrorist threat. A few days ago, President Hollande closed a painful chapter by dropping the project of constitutional revision that would have made it possible to strip convicted terrorists of French citizenship. Since then, however, the government’s labour market reform project has become the new hot potato. What is dubbed Loi El-Khomri – after the name of the labour minister – is a last-ditch attempt to tackle France’s structural problem with unemployment and demonstrate the government’s reforming credentials before the 2017 national elections. Unfortunately, the government has made a pretty poor start (with thousands on strike last week).

Why the reform?

The reasons why a reform is deemed necessary are several. The big picture is France’s stubbornly high unemployment rate at about 10 per cent. In fairness, French unemployment did not soar after the 2008 crash in the same proportions as other EU countries. However, France started from a solid 8 per cent unemployment rate, a level that has been the norm since the early 1980s. In 1992 already, Francois Mitterrand famously declared: “We have tried everything against unemployment”. Since then the French political class, right or left, has kept trying, in vain, to address France’s number one problem. Subsidised jobs, reduced working time, lower taxes for employers, easier dismissals, activation policies: none of these measures has made a substantial impact. More worryingly, youth and long-term unemployment are particularly high, and labour market dualism is real: 87 per cent of hirings are temporary contracts (2015) and, since 2000, their number has soared while those of permanent contracts have stagnated.
There are two more short-term reasons compelling Hollande to act. On the one hand, he has repeated time and again that he would not run in 2017 if he did not manage to “reverse the unemployment curve”. Yet time is running short, and the latest monthly figures have sent mixed signals at best. On the other hand, the EU has long been asking for a substantial labour market reform in France of the same calibre as Hartz IV. If he wants to keep benefiting from relative fiscal leniency and an accommodating monetary policy, Hollande needs to show some good will.

What is the reform?

The main thrust of the reform is to give more space for company-level negotiation on working time and pay in order to facilitate adjustment to new market environments. Labour legislation and the standards set at sectoral level would become less important. In other words, the bill would greatly advance internal firm flexibility – rather than modify the main parameters of French labour legislation.

In particular, firms would have the possibility to implement a lower rate of overtime pay. Today, overtime is paid at 25 per cent more for the first 8 hours (a week) and 50 per cent more beyond that, with a minimum of 10 per cent in case of a branch-level agreement. In the same spirit, employers and employee representatives could negotiate company-level agreements to adjust working time and pay in order to reach new objectives (accord de développement de l’emploi). These agreements would complement a more ‘defensive’ version (accord de maintien dans l’emploi) created in 2013, which has only been available to large firms running into difficulties. If no agreement can be reached, any trade union representing more than 30 per cent of the employees could request the organisation of a referendum within the firm.

Continue reading “French labour market reform: good intentions, poor delivery”